Bert T. McKee v. Industrial Commission of the State of Utah and Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company : Brief of Defendants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
Bert T. McKee v. Industrial Commission of the
State of Utah and Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe
Company : Brief of Defendants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Clinton D. Vernon; Attorney General; Allen B. Sorensen; Assistant Attorney General; Stephens,
Brayton & Lowe, Attorneys for Defendants;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, McKee v. Industrial Comm. Of Utah, No. 7258 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/994
.CASE NO. 7258 
·IN mE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BERT T •. McKEE, 
Plaintiff and Ap.pUcant, 
. vs. 
IltJ.lUBTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
Tl{E STATE OF UTAH, and 
PACIFIC ·STATES CAST IRON 
~E COMPANY~ a corporation, 
Defe'!tdants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
.Attorne1J General 
".·I·L· E 4!)- B. SORENSEN, 
·. . . . . .I Assistant Attorney Gerneral 
.·:·'·:·:~ 2C 1S6'JSTEPHENS ·BRAYTON &.LOWE 
. ' . . ' .~ .. ,. ... ..;;._ • ..: ... ----u-a.f"Uii.7ftorneys for Defend,ants 
... fPRE.ME CO , . . . . 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ··········---------·--···---··-··-·····-·-·-·--·········-······· 1 
ARGUMENT: 
The Statute of Limitations Begins to Run from the Date 
of the Accident, and the Statute of Limitations has 
Run·----·-··-··············-·-·····--------··--·--···--····-·····-····················· 2 
There is no Violation of the Due Process Clause.................... 5 
Defendant is not Estopped from Relying upon the 
Statute of Limitations ·---··-·-··-----·-·--···------·-------·-·---········ 7 
The Statement by the Company Doctor was Correct............ 7 
Plaintiff Cannot Rely upon Mistake to Toll the Statute________ 8 
Even if Dr. Taylor Knowingly Withheld Information, the 
Statute is not Tolled ·-·----··----------·--------·----------·------------·--· 10 
Misrepresentation as to Extent of Injury does not Toll 
the Statute of Limitations ----·-·-------·--···--·---·-----------------·-·· 11 
Withholding of X-Rays had no Effect upon the Tolling 
of the Statute of Limitations.·--···----·-··----------------·-----·-·---· 13 
If there was a Misrepresentation, there was no Reliance 
Thereon by Plaintiff ---·---·---------·----·--------·--·--------------·--···· 13 
CONCLUSION ----·--------··-·····--··········-----------·--------------·····----·-----·---···-·· 14 
AUTHORITIES CITED: 
108 A.L.R. 316, 317 ------------··--·······-·····--··---·-----------·-------------·- 4 
173 A.L.R. 576 ·------·----------··-·--········-·-····-···---------------------------·-·- 9 
19 Am. Jur. (Estoppel) Par. 83 ····---····--··-·----·-···----·-·----·-······· 14 
Anderson vs. Contract Trucking Co., 48 N. M. 158, 146 
P. 2d 8 7 3 ----------------------------------------··---·--------------·----·-······· 9 
Dane vs. Michigan United Traction Company, 200 Mich. 
612, 166 N.W. 1017 ------------------------------------------·------------··· 5 
Ehrhart vs. Industrial Commission, 172 Cal. 621, 158 
p. 19 3 ---·------------·---------------·-·-----·-------------------·-----------------· 5 
Hallstrom vs. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 85, 83 P. 
2d 7 3 0 ·-----------------------------·----·--------·------------------··----------·---- 3 
Maloney vs. Brackett, 275 Mass. 479, 176 N.E. 604.·---·-·-·-·-- 9 
Masich vs. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining 
Co., ·--·---- Utah ------·-· 191 P. 2d 612, 624---·--·-----·-··-·····-- 6 
Pashley vs. Pacific Electric Company, 25 Cal. 2d 226, 
153 P. 2d 325 ----··---·--·-----------------·-----------------·---------------9, 10 
Peteler vs. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P. 2d 244. ___________ 9, 10, 11 
Pruett vs. Wichita Falls & SR Co., ________ Texas --------· 109 
s.w. 2d 53 8 ··---·---··-····-----------------··----·-----------··---------·-·····- 12 
Salt Lake City vs. Industrial Commission, 93 Utah 510, 
7 4 P. 2d 6 57 --------·--·----·-·-------------·-------·-------------·-----····-----· 3 
Smith vs. Solvay Process Co., 100 Kan. 40, 163 P. 645........ 5 
Williams vs. Industrial Commission, 95 Utah 376, 81 
P. 2d 6 4 9 --------·---···-··-----------·-----·····--------------·--------------------- 3 
Utah Code Annotated 1943 
42-1-79 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12 
4 2-1-9 2 -·----·---------·-------------------------- -------------------- ---------·-·--· 4 
104-2-26 ·--·-------------------------------------------------------------------·----3, 4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BERT T. :McKEE, 
Plaintiff and Applicant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF CASE NO. 7258 
THE STATE OF UTAH, and 
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON 
PIPE COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants disagree with the statement of facts set 
forth in plaintiff's brief in the following particulars: 
The 1937 injury which plaintiff suffered resulted 
in disability from ''tenderness right inguinal region-
torn muscles, right side" (Tr. 124). For the 1944 injury 
Dr. Taylor, ihe company doctor, was not consulted by 
plaintiff for either treatment or diagnosis. Dr. Taylor 
merely made a physical examination of plaintiff for 
and on behalf of the company so that the company could 
determine whether or not to hire plaintiff (Tr. 97, 168). 
Plaintiff had consulted and relied upon doctors of his 
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2 
own choosing, a chiropractor and Dr. Orton, for diagnosis 
and treatment (Tr. 97, 168) and had had diagnosis 
and treatment prior to the time he saw Dr. Taylor. Dr. 
Orton made a diagnosis of rheumatism and muscular 
spasm prior to Dr. Taylor's di~gnosis, and treated 
plaintiff therefor continuously until1946 (Tr. 71-76, 103). 
Dr. Taylor's X-rays showed no bony deformity (Tr. 142). 
They were taken after plaintiff had been to his own 
doctors and after plaintiff was ready to return to work. 
Dr. Taylor, not plaintiff's doctors, then informed McKee 
that he should not work (Tr. 73). Dr. Taylor made a 
diagnosis "back lists to right, muscles is spasm, move-
ments limited. . . . In view of these findings a diagnosis 
of lumbago was made" (Tr. 142). Dr. Orton did not rely 
upon Dr. Taylor's diagnosis since Dr. Orton's diagnosis 
was made first (Tr. 108). Dr. Taylor's X-rays were 
made available to plaintiff through the Industrial Com-
mission (Tr. 118). No request for the X-rays was made 
by plaintiff until more than 3 years after the accident 
(Tr. 118). Plaintiff was put on notice of his injury at 
the time of the accident by reason of the fact that 
''something snapped in his back which caused terrific 
pain, which has never quit" (Tr. 48). 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGINS TO 
RUN FROM THE DATE OF THE ACCIDENT, AND 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN. 
Plaintiff, Bert McKee, argues that the statute of 
limitations applicable to his claim does not begin to run 
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3 
until the disability became apparent to McKee, or, until 
the compensable nature of an injury became apparent 
to him; and if the statute of limitations is construed to 
run from the time of the occurrence of the accident as 
distinguished from the time of disability, or knowledge 
of disability, that it is unconstitutional as a violation 
of due process of law. McKee cites the case of Salt Lake 
City vs. Industrial Commission, 93 Utah 510, 74 P. (2nd) 
657. In that case it was held that Section 104-2-26, (which 
provided for a one year statute of limitations on a 
liability created by statute) was controlling. This case 
also held that the statute begins to run ''not from the 
time of the accident, but from the time of the employer's 
failure to pay compensation for disability when the dis-
ability can be ascertained, and the duty to pay compen-
sation arises." The case of Williams vs. Industrial Com-
mission, 95 Utah 376, 81 P. (2nd) 649; cited by McKee, 
applies the same statute. In the case of Hallstrom vs. , 
industrial Commission, 96 Utah 85, 83 P. (2nd) 730, 
the Court applied this same one year statute, but referred 
to and clarified the Salt Lake City decision (supra). The 
court said: 
"The mere fact that an applicant does not 
deduce from an apparent physical infirmity the 
conclusion that it came from a former accident 
occurring in industry does not prevent the statute 
from running." 
Applying the law of these cases to McKee's situation, 
McKee would be barred by the statute because both the 
evidence offered by McKee (Tr. 71-72) and the Findings 
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of the Commission (Tr. 48) show that McKee, on the 
21st day of February 1944, while carrying and stacking 
5 foot pipes, felt something snap in his back which caused 
terrific pain and which has never quit. He thus at that 
time was aware of his physical infirmity, and the mere 
fact that he did not deduce from his apparent physical 
infirmity the conclusion that it came from an accident 
occurring in industry, did not :prevent the statute from 
running. 
But an even stronger case is now presented because 
in 1939, after the cases above cited were decided, a 
special statute of limitations, 42-1-92, was enacted which 
superseded the general one year statute, 104-2-26, and 
provided, in part, as follows : 
"If no claim for compensation is filed with 
the Industrial Commission within three years 
from the date of the accident, or the date of last 
payment of compensation, the right to compensa-
tion shall be wholly barred.'' 
The effect of this amendment is, in plain words, that 
the statute shall run from the time of the accident and 
not from the time of the injury. The Legislature was 
changing the rule which theretofore existed. The Com-
mission found that an accident occurred on the. 21st day 
of February, 1944, and that an application was filed on 
May 28th, 1948. This is more than the three years pro-
vided for and McKee's claim is therefore barred. The 
annotation at 108 A.L.R. 316, 317 lists a number of cases 
''where the compensation acts required claims for com-
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pensation to be made within a certain period, 'after the 
accident', in which it was held that the time for filing 
claims began to run from the time the accident occurred 
and not from the time when a compensable injury became 
apparent." In construing a similar statute, the court in 
Dane vs. Michigan United Traction Company, 200 Michi-
gan 612, 166 N.W. 1017, said: 
''The construction which the section should 
receive is that the time commences to run fron1 
the day the accident causes the injury. This con-
struction is in keeping with the intent of the 
legislature to create a statute of limitations, and 
thereby fix a time when employers could feel cer-
tain that their liability in any :particular case 
had ended.'' 
See also, Smith vs. Solvay Process Company, 100 
Kan. 40, 163 P. 645: Ehrhart vs. Industrial Commission, 
172 Cal. 621, 158 P. 193. 
Thus the statute of limitations has run against 
McKee's claims. 
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF THE 
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. 
Plaintiff argues that if the statute of limitations is 
construed as running from the date of the accident as 
dis·tinguished from the date the compensability of the 
accident became apparent, that it would be in violation 
of the due process clause of the constitution as depriving 
him of a fundamental right. Plaintiff's claim was created 
by an Aet of the Legislature and, in creating a right 
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or cause of action, the Legislature has power to place 
limitations thereon. In fact, the Legislature has power 
not only to limit, but also to take away, both statutory 
and common law rights. In the recent case of Masich vs. 
United States Sme:lting, Refining & Mining Company, 
---- Utah ____ , 191 P. (2Iid) 612, 624, a question arose as 
to the construction and ·constitutionality of statutes pro-
viding that Workmen's Compensation rights should be 
exclusive and an injured employee should be deprived 
of his common law action for negligence. The court held 
that in the case of partial disability for silicosis the 
Legislature had deprived the employee of his common 
law right of action for negligence and had given no 
substitute remedy under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. The court held that there was no violation of the 
Constitution. Mr. Justice Latimer said as follows: 
''It has always been contended by employers 
that the act offended the due process clause 
because it abolished certain defenses such as con-
tributory negligence, fellow servant, and assump-
tion of risk, and by the employee because it 
abolished the common law tight of action for neg-
ligence. The contention has been overruled be-
cause no one has a vested right in any rule of law. 
A statutory right can be taken away and it may 
vest the individual with a right as sacred and 
important as one existing under common law prin-
ciples. Many states must have held that both 
statutory rights and common law rights can be 
taken away, otherwise, there can be no question 
that acts which abolish actions for seduction, 
breach of promise, criminal conversation, and 
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alienation of affections, would be unconstitu-
tional.'' 
There thus is no -violation of plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights. 
DEFENDANT IS NOTESTOPPED FROM RELYING 
UPON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
THE STATEMENT BY THE COMPANY 
DOCTOR WAS CORRECT. 
Plaintiff argues that defendant is estopped from 
relying upon the statute of limitations because of mistake 
and fraud. As a basis therefor, plaintiff introduced 
statements by the company doctor, Dr. Taylor, that the 
X-rays did not disclose any bony deformity of the back. 
Inasmuch as the Commission rejected plaintiff's conten-
tion that defendant was estopped from relying upon the 
statute of limitations, it is not now within the province 
of this court to say that as a matter of law the Commis-
sion should have found the fact to be ·that Dr. Taylor 
was wrong in his diagnosis. There was a question of 
fact as to whether or not there was any misrepresenta-
tion, and there is sufficient evidence from which the 
Commission could have found there was none. Defend-
ant submits that the statement of Dr. Taylor, that the 
X-ray did not show any deformity, was correct. Even 
Dr. Richards, plaintiff's witness, in testifying that there 
was a bony deformity apparent in the company's X-rays, 
testified it was difficult for him to see such deformity 
(Tr. 163). Plaintiff's evidence to rebut Dr. Taylor's 
diagnosis of lumbago is Dr. Richards' testimony that 
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"ordinarily" rheumatism over a "substantial" period 
of time has an effect on the bone structure which would 
show in an X-ray, and that there was no indication of 
rheumatism on the X-rays (Tr. 165-166). The Commis-
sion was free to consider other evidence on the point, 
such as the letter from Dr. Taylor to the Company (ap-
plicant's exhibit A, (Tr. 142) wherein it was stated 
"X-rays were taken which show no bony deformity" and 
the X-rays themselves, (applicant's exhibit D), and a 
similar diagnosis by plaintiff's doctor, Dr. Orton, all of 
which are evidence sufficient to support a finding that 
there was no bony deformity. Plaintiff's own doctor 
testified that he treated plaintiff for lumbago or mus-
cular spasm (Tr. 103). The doctor said he relied upon 
Dr. Taylor's diagnosis from X-rays, but Dr. Taylor had 
not taken the X-rays at the time Dr. Orton treated plain-
tiff for lumbago (Tr. 71-76). The Commission expressly 
found that there was an injury, but it made no finding 
that there was. a bony deformity. In other words, the 
conclusion made by the Commission that the plaintiff 
was barred by the statute of limitations is supported 
by evidence that there was no bony deformity, thus there 
was no misrepresentation, mistaken or fraudulent, and 
thus no estoppel. 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT RELY UPON MISTAKE 
TO TOLL THE STATUTE. 
If it be assumed that Dr. Taylor's reading of the 
X-ray was incorrect, and that there was a bony deform-
ity, and if such diagnosis were a mistake, the statute 
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of limitations is not tolled. The case of Maloney vs. 
Brackett, 275 Mass. 479,176 N.E. 604, was a case in which 
the plaintiff sued two physicians for malpractice, alleg-
ing fraudulent concealment as excuse for late filing, and 
the trial court entered judgment on a directed verdict 
for the defendants. In overruling the plaintiff's excep-
tions, it was held that the failure of a doctor to disclose 
a cause of action to a patient could not be found to be 
a breach of his professional duty without evidence that 
he knew or believed that a cause of action existed; that 
there was no evidence that either defendant knew or 
believed that he had performed or assisted in the per-
formance of an unnecessary operation, and that the 
prediction as to plaintiff's recovery made before the 
operation had no tendency to :prove that they did not 
in good faith consider the operation advisable. 
The annotation cited by plaintiff at 173 A.L.R. 576 
is authority for tolling the statute of limitations in the 
case of fraud only. The two· cases cited by plaintiff, 
Pashley vs. Pacific Electric Company, 25 Cal. (2nd) 226, 
153 P. (2nd) 325, and Peteler vs. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 
17 P. (2nd) 244, were both cases of a fraudulent mis-
representation by a doctor who was treating the plaintiff. 
The only other case cited by plaintiff purporting to deal 
with mistake or fraud, is the case of Anderson vs. Con-
tract Trucking Company, 48 N. M. 158, 146 P. (2nd) 873. 
This case was not one of fraud or mistake. It was merely 
dealing with the question of when the statute of limita-
tions begins to run. It applied the New Mexico statute 
and held that the statute provided that the :period of 
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limitation should commence to run when the injury 
became apparent as distinguished from when the accident 
occurred. This case cites with approval those Utah cases 
decided before the Utah Statute was amended to run 
from the date of the accident as distinguished from the 
date of the injury. 
There is no ·evidence in the record to indicate that 
Dr. Taylor's diagnosis, if wrong, was anything more 
than a mistake, and mistake does not toll the statute of 
limitations. 
EVEN IF DR. TAYLOR KNOWINGLY WITHHELD 
INFORMATION, THE STATUTE IS NOT TOLLED. 
In the case of Peteler vs. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P. 
(2nd) 244, 250, the court said: 
''In courts of equity it is settled doctrine that 
a fraudulent concealment of a cause of action will 
postpone the operation 'Of the statute of limita-
tions until the discovery of the fraud, and by the 
weight of authority the same rule prevails in 
actions at law. 37 C.J. 972. As a general rult•, 
it may be stated that, in the absence of a trust 
or fiduciary relation between the parties, a fail-
ure or withholding of known facts or concealing 
of them by the alleged responsible :party and of 
which the other party is ignorant, and which go 
to make up or give a right to a cause of action, 
is not such a fraudulent concealment of the cause 
of action as to prevent the running of the statute.'' 
McKee's case is distinguished from both the Peteler 
case (supra) and from Pashley vs. Pacific Electric Com-
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pany, (supra), the only cases cited by plaintiff dealing 
with misrepresentations, by reason of the fact that Dr. 
Taylor was not McKee's doctor. There was no fiduciary 
relationship inasmuch as Dr. Taylor was merely acting 
on behalf of the defendant company to examine and not 
to treat McKee, (Tr. 97, 168). Dr. Taylor's sole purpose 
was to find out on behalf of the company whether McKee 
was physically able to work. Thus, under the Peteler 
rule, even if Dr. Taylor knowingly and intentionally with. 
held from him information as to McKee's true condition, 
the statute would not be tolled inasmuch as there was no 
fiduciary relationship. 
MISREPRESENTATION AS TO EXTENT OF 
INJURY DOES NOT TOLL THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS. 
So long as McKee knew there was something wrong 
with his back, even if it be assumed that Dr. Taylor 
fraudulently made a false diagnosis in order to prevent 
McKee from filing a claim, he cannot rely upon estoppel. 
One aware of an injury, who was misinformed by de-
fendant as to the extent thereof, cannot rely on the 
position that defendant is estopped from relying on the 
statute of limitations, even where the statute begins to 
run from the time the injury becomes apparent, as dis-
tinguished from the time of the accident. The court in 
Peteler vs. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 Pac. (2nd) 244, 250, 
said: 
"It may also be stated that, where the alleged 
tort or breach is complete and is not continuing, 
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ignorance of the plaintiff as to the extent of the 
consequential injury or damage until after the 
statute of limitations had run does not postpone 
the running of the statute." 
Here the Commission in its findings of fact found 
''while carrying and stacking five foot pipes, something 
snap;ped in his back which caused terrific pain which 
has never quit" (Tr. 48). Such a finding is binding upon 
this court, 42-1-79, U.C.A. 1943. Defendant therefore 
knew from the time of the accident to date, without con-
sulting any doctor, that there was something wrong with 
his back. If he did not conclude that his injury was of a 
serious enough nature to warrant making a claim against 
his employer until after the statute of limitations had 
run, he is nevertheless barred. Pruett vs. Wichita Falls 
& S. R. Company, ____ Texas ____ , 109 S.W. (2nd) 538. 
Combining Dr. Taylor's diagnosis of lumbago and 
the findings of the Commission, plaintiff was aware of 
facts which would have enabled him to recover if he had 
filed a claim within the limitation period. For, although 
lumbago itself is not compensable, a "lighting up" or 
aggravation of a pre-·existing condition or weakness is 
compensable. Under the Commission's findings there 
was such a "lighting up" when "something snapped in 
his back which caused terrific pain". There \Yas thus no 
re:presentation by the company doctor to the effect that 
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WITHHOLDING OF X-RAYS HAD NO EFFECT 
UPON THE TOLLING OF THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Plaintiff complains that the X-rays were withheld 
from him and that he was therefore prevented from filing 
his claim in time. Plaintiff knew without having a doctor 
look at X-rays that he suffered an injury while working 
because of the "terrific pain". Furthermore, defendant 
did not refuse to allow McKee access to the X-rays, hut 
only declined to give them directly to McKee ( Tr. 118, 
148). This was not done for the suppression of informa-
tion but for the safekeeping of company property and 
records, inasmuch as the defendant told plaintiff the 
X-rays and any other information desired were available 
upon request of the Commission (Tr. 118-119). Further-
more, plaintiff did not ask for the X-rays or work record 
until the fall of 1947 (Tr. 118-119). The accident occurred 
February 21, 1944 (Tr. 48). The three year statute of 
limitations had run before any request was made to 
see the X-rays. Defendant therefore submits that the 
refusal to give :plaintiff the X-rays and work record had 
no ·effect whatever upon plaintiff's timely filing of his 
claim and therefore could have no effect upon estoppel 
of defendant to rely upon the limitation period. 
IF THERE WAS A MISREPRESENTATION, THERE 
WAS NO RELIANCE THEREON BY PLAINTIFF. 
Further evidence upholding the Commission's deci-
sion is that there was no reliance by plaintiff upon any 
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statement made by Dr. Taylor. Without reliance there 
can be no estoppel, 19 Am. Jur. (Estoppel) Par. 83. 
Plaintiff (Tr. 168) and iplaintiff's wife (Tr. 97) both 
testified that Dr. Taylor was consulted only to get a 
clearance to go hack to work, after plaintiff's own doctors 
had made their own diagnoses and given plaintiff their 
own treatments (Tr. 103). Plaintiff was relying upon his 
own doctors and not upon Dr. Taylor in deciding whether 
or not to file a claim. Plaintiff did not go to Dr. Taylor 
to find out what was wrong with him. He went to Dr. 
Taylor presenting himself as able and ready to go back 
to work after treatment by his own doctors. It is reason-
able to assume that his own doctors had said he was 
able to work. It was only when plaintiff went to the 
company doctor that he was told that he was not well, 
that his "back lists to right, muscles in spasm" and that 
plaintiff should not work. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant therefore submits that the statute of 
limitations provides that a claim must be filed within 
three years from the date of the accident. Plaintiff did 
not so file. Defendant is not estopped from relying 
upon the statute of limitations because there was no 
misrepresentation by defendant or its doctor. And if 
there was a conscious withholding of information, there 
was no fiduciary relationship between plaintiff and de-
fendant and defendant's doctor, so the statute was not 
tolled. If there was a misrepresentation by defendant 
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through its doctor, the statute is still not tolled because 
of the following reasons : 
1. It was due to mistake, not fraud. 
2. It was a misrepresentation as to the extent 
of the injury, rather than as to the exist-
ence of any injury. 
3. There was no reliance upon the misrepre-
sentation. 
Res:pectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, 
Assistant Attorney General 
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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